1. The "violence of faction" is the "mortal disease" of popular governments. The public assemblies have been infected with the vice of majority tyranny: "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."

2. What is a faction? "A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."

3. How can we cure "the mischiefs of faction?" We can either cure it by I) "removing its causes," or II) "controlling its effects."

4. There are "two methods of removing the causes of faction": I a) destroy "the liberty essential to its existence," or I b) give "to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."

5. I a) is a "remedy that is worse than the disease," because it is "unwise." It entails the abolition of liberty, "which is essential to political life."

6. I b) is "impracticable." Opinions, passions, and interests are unlikely to be in harmony. "The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government." And that leads to "the division of society into different interests and parties."

7. Further consideration of I b). "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man." Thus, there are many sources of factions, "but the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." The "regulation of these various and interfering interests," that "grow up of necessity in civilized nations & forms the principal task of modern legislation and forms the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government."

8. Further consideration of I b). Legislators, alas, tend to be "advocates and parties to the causes which they determine." But "justice and the public good," require "impartiality."

9. Further consideration of I b). "It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."

10. Conclusion to I b) and the introduction to II. "The inference to which we are brought is that [I] the causes of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of [II] controlling its effects."

11. Further consideration of II) "controlling its effects." "The republican principle" of majority rule is the solution to minority faction. But what if we have majority faction? "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is then the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has labored and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind."

12. The introduction of II a) and II b) as the solutions to majority faction. "Either [II a)] the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or [II b)] the majority having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression."

13. The introduction of III, the form of government, to implement the solution. Madison declares that III a) "pure democracy," works against solutions II a) and II b.

14. III b) "a republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking."

15. "The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic."

16. The first difference III b)* is "to refine and enlarge the public views" by way of the election system. The question is do we choose "small (IVa) or extensive (IVb) republics?"

17. IV b) is better than IV a) because it provides "a greater probability of a fit choice" of representatives.

18. IV b) is better than IV a) because it "will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried."

19. The Constitution "forms a happy combination" of IVa) and IVb): "the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures."

20. The second difference III b)** "is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government."

21. III b)** clinches the case for IV b) over IV a).

22. "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States."

23. "In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."

1. The way to implement the theory of separation of powers in practice is to so contrive "the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."

2. Accordingly, "each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others."

3. "It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for the emoluments annexed to their offices."

4. A: "The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others… Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."

B: Isn't relying on ambition and interest, "a reflection on human nature?" But, adds Madison, what is government itself but the greatest reflection on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary."

C: "The Great Difficulty" of Founding: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government, but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."

5. "This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public." Madison calls this policy "inventions of prudence."

6. "In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." Thus, it is "not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense." Accordingly, we need to add here and subtract there. We can divide the legislature into two branches and fortify the executive a) with the power of a conditional veto and b) "some qualified connection" with the Senate.

7. The general government comes closer to passing the "self-defense" of each branch test than do the State governments.

8. "There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view."

9. First, America is a "compound republic," rather than a "single republic." This provides for a "double security… to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."

10. Second, there are only two ways to combat "the evil" of majority faction, a) "by creating a will in the community independent of the majority," or b) creating an authoritative source "dependent on the society," but, and here is the essence of the American experiment, the society "will be broken down into so many parts," that it contain a vast number and variety of interests.

1. Fifth. A Senate is valuable because it provides " a due sense of national character."

2. and 3. In particular, it is wise to listen to the "opinion of the impartial world," and the "unbiased part of mankind" lest the "numerous and changeable" House of Representatives "be warped by some strong passions or momentary interest."

4. Sixth. Madison introduces a "new, but paradoxical, understanding" of "the due responsibility in the government to the people."

5. Instead of understanding "responsibility" exclusively in terms of "dependence on the people" through "the frequency of elections, " Madison puts forth the idea of the "responsibility" of the representatives to the long run interests of the community.

6. This is the "responsibility" of the Senate.

7. The Senate is valuable at certain "critical moments" in "public affairs." It is "salutary" to have a Senate that can check the "temporary errors and delusions of the people," until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind." The vital role of the Senate in the institutional framework, then, is to secure the principle of "the cool and deliberate sense of the community."

8. Madison revisits the importance of "the extension of the orbit" element in the science of politics introduced in Federalist 9 and explicated in Federalist 10. He admits that the extended orbit theory of Federalist 10 is necessary but insufficient and, may in fact, be counterproductive. Once again, we need further "auxiliary precautions" to make the American experiment succeed.

9. To be sure, America is different from other governments, both "ancient and modern." Yet, it is instructive to note that "history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate."

10. Madison repeats the claim of Federalist 9 that "the principle of representation" is the pivotal difference between the American model and those found in antiquity. He revisits the claim that the principle of representation was "unknown" to the ancients.

11, 12, & 13. The extent to which the principle of representation was used in antiquity.

14. Thus, "it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political institutions." The unique feature of the American experiment is, that for the first time, we have "the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity, from any share" in the government," rather than " the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration" of the government." Madison then concludes "that to insure this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory."

1. "It is a general principle of human nature that a man will be interested in what he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it." The duration provision helps the President to be "interested" in resisting the "ill-humors" of society and a "predominant faction in the legislative body."

2. "The servile pliancy of the executive to a prevailing current in the community or in the legislature" is NOT "its best recommendation." The President must resist a "complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion" that might emerge in the society contrary to the true interests of the people, and, instead be "the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusions in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection." It is the duty of the executive to secure the "republican principle": "the deliberate sense of the community should govern."

3. "The executive should be in a situation to dare to act… with vigor and decision."

4. "The fundamental principles of good government" requires a fortification of the executive against the "almost irresistible" tendency in "governments purely republican" for the "legislative authority to absorb every other."

5-7. "It may be asked whether a duration of four years" is sufficient. It may not "completely answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the government."

1. "We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department."

2. The coverage of the judiciary is in two parts: A) "the manner of constituting it" and B) "its extent."

3. There are three A) "objects." "1st. The mode of appointing the judges. 2nd. The tenure by which they are to hold their places. 3rd. The partition of the judicial authority between different courts and their relations to each other." [See Federalist 81.]

4. A) 1st. See Federalist 76 and 77.

5. A) 2nd. "As to tenure by which the judges are to hold their places: this chiefly concerns [1] their duration in office, [II] the provisions for their support, [III] the precaution for their responsibility." The remainder of the essay covers the case for [I] their duration in office. {Article III, Section 1.}

6. "The standard of good behavior…is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government." It helps the judiciary to resist "legislative encroachment." 7-17 makes the case for "permanent tenure" to resist the encroachment of the legislature.

7. The judiciary "will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution…. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment."

8. The judiciary is "the weakest of the three departments of power," and its "natural feebleness" needs fortification.

9. "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority." It is the "duty" of the courts, "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void."

10. The opposition thinks that this "doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power."

11. But "every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void."

12. The courts are an "intermediate body between the people and the legislature" to keep the latter within their proper sphere. The legislature cannot be "the constitutional judges of their own powers." The Constitution is the fundamental law and it belongs to the courts to "ascertain its meaning" and to secure "the intention of the people" over "the intention of their agents" whenever there is "an irreconcilable variance between the two." "The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts." Since the Constitution is the "fundamental law," it therefore belongs to the Supreme Courts "to ascertain its meaning."

13. This does not "suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power."

14. "In determining between two contradictory laws…it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation. So far as they can, by any fair construction" they ought to "be reconciled to each other." When "impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one in exclusion of the other."

15. "Whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former."

16. "It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure for the constitutional intentions of the legislature…. The courts must declare the sense of the law," and not "be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT."

17. "The permanent tenure of judicial offices" is critical if the courts are to be "the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments."

18. "Permanent tenure" can help to resist the "ill humors" that may momentarily "lay hold" of the people to violate the Constitution. "As faithful guardians of the Constitution," the courts must restore the norm of "more deliberate reflection."

19. "Permanent tenure" can also help to resist legislative efforts to injure "the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws."

20. "Permanent tenure" is needed so that courts provide "inflexible adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals."

21. "Permanent tenure" is needed to attract individuals with the "requisite integrity," and the "requisite knowledge" to handle the "variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind." But "to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them."

22. "Good behavior" for justices has the added benefit of securing "good government."

1, 2. "The most considerable of these remaining objections is that 2) the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights." True, New York doesn't have a "prefixed" bill of rights, but the opposition claim that the New York Constitution contains the "substance" of a bill of rights "in the body of it" and "adopts" the British "common and statute law."

3. "The Constitution proposed by the convention contains…a number of such provisions."

4. He lists eight rights located "in the body" of the U.S. Constitution: a) The post impeachment-conviction provision of Article I, Section 3; b) four rights from Article I, Section 9—the privilege of habeas corpus, no bill of attainder, no ex-post facto laws, and "no title of nobility;"—and c) three rights from Article III, Sections 2—the provision for trial by jury in criminal cases and the two parts of the treason clause.

5. These are "of equal importance with any which are to be listed found in the constitution of this State." Blackstone, for example, thinks "the habeas corpus act" is "the BULWARK of the British Constitution."

6. The prohibition on titles of nobility "may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republican government."

7. The claim that the New York Constitution "adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain" is simply false. "They are expressly made subject 'to such alterations and provisions as the legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same.'"

8. "Bills of Rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects." The "We the people" clause in the Preamble to the Constitution "is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principle figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government."

9, 10. "Bills of Rights…are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be dangerous."

11. A declaration protecting liberty of the press is "impracticable." We must seek its security "on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the government."

12. "The Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." It meets two vital objects of a bill of rights: it 1) declares and specifies "the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government," and 2) defines "certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private concerns."

13-15. Hamilton answers objection 3) that the citizens will lack the "proper knowledge" to judge the conduct of a government so far removed from the people. This will be "overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State governments" on the conduct of "persons employed in every department of the national administration." Moreover, "the public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union."

16. An "extraordinary" objection is 4) "the want of some provision respecting the debts due to the United States." This, says Hamilton, is simply "inflammatory."

17-24. He turns, finally, to the claim that 5) "the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable increase of expense." But look what we gain from the increase: a new and improved system of government; "it is certain that a government less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union." One observer suggests that "the dreaded augmentation of expense" will spring from "the multiplication of offices under the new government." This is ridiculous since there are few new offices. True, the judges will be an added expense, but this will be of no "material consequence." And this will "counterbalance" the decline in the expenses of a) Congress since "a great part" of their business "will be transacted by the President," and b) the State legislatures since "the Congress under the proposed government will do all the business of United States themselves, without the interference of the State legislatures." But won't there be an increase in the expense of running the House with an augmentation in the number of representatives? "No." Currently, there are "sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth or a fifth of that number."