 1787
| October 1787
|  Oct 18, 1787: Brutus I (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist, anticipating by two weeks the opening paragraph of Federalist 1, also addressed to the people of New York, introduces his own first essay with the observation that "the most important question that was ever proposed to your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you." Nothing less than "the dignity of human nature" and the blessings of liberty are at stake. Brutus then argues that "although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it." The necessary and proper clause, the supremacy clause, and the judicial power have the potentiality to transform America from a system of confederated states into a "complete consolidated government." And anticipating the distinction between a democracy and a republic in Federalist 10 and 63, and agreeing that a representative government is to be preferred to a pure democracy, Brutus then argues that, contrary to wisdom and experience, the Framers have given us "an extensive republic" rather than a confederation of small republics. A "free republic" over "such vast extent" of territory is impracticable because, in time, the people will become "acquainted with very few of their rulers" and lose "confidence" in, and control over, the government.
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| November 1787
| Nov 1, 1787: Brutus II (New York)
| He considers "the merits" of his argument in Brutus I "that to reduce the thirteen states into one government, would prove the destruction of your liberties." Again anticipating The Federalist, Brutus argues that "when a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid." But the foundation of the Constitution is poorly laid because it lacks a declaration of rights "expressly reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights, as are not necessary to be parted with." He rejects as "specious" the arguments of an unnamed Framer's State House speech (James Wilson) as to why a bill of rights is unnecessary: after all, "the powers, rights, and authority, granted to the general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government." Furthermore, why did the Framers secure certain rights in Article I, Section 9, "but omitted others of more importance"?
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| Nov 15, 1787: Brutus III (New York)
| In this essay, Brutus, anticipating Federalist 55, attempts to show that in the Constitution "the powers are not properly deposited, for the security of public liberty." He is a firm supporter of the position that "representation in government should be in exact proportion to the numbers" of people. Thus he is upset with 1) the 3/5 provision in the scheme of representation in the House, 2) equal representation for the States in the Senate, 3) the insufficiency in the number of representatives to be elected, 4) the lack of provision for a "resemblance" of the "true likeness of the people" in the assembly, 5) the probability that only the "rich" and "well born" will be represented, and 6) things will get worse. In short, "the representation is merely nominal—a mere burlesque; and that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence."
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| Nov 29, 1787: Brutus IV (New York)
| Anticipating Federalist 51 and 55, Brutus states that "experience has taught mankind" the need for special precautions in the framing of free governments. "The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation; this, therefore, is the great desideratum in politics." It is more important that the government be in accordance "with the will of the people" and not "the will of the few" rather than "the administration of it be good or ill." Brutus ends with a prophecy: "power, lodged in the hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost always used to the oppression of the people, and the aggrandizement of themselves."
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1788
| January 1788
| Jan 17, 1788: Brutus IX (New York)
| Brutus begins the essay with the following statement: "The design of civil government is to protect the rights and promote the happiness of the people." And the question of this essay is: Does the Constitution pass this test? The state constitutions pass the test because their constitutions have either a prefatory bill of rights or restrictions on power within their documents. But the Framers of the general government leave us confused. They constrain the general government from doing some things—no bill of attainder—but don't address others—no standing army in time of peace—so what are they up to? Brutus criticizes the arguments of an unidentified "author" who argues that a provision in the Constitution with respect to standing armies is unnecessary and dangerous. Over half the essay is then devoted to criticizing the remarks of "a writer who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution" on behalf of standing armies. This writer, says Brutus, calls "into question the candor and integrity of those who advance the objection," and with insinuating that "their intention is to mislead the people, by alarming their passions, rather than convincing them by arguments addressed to their understandings." We think Brutus has in mind Hamilton's remarks in Federalist 1.
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| Jan 31, 1788: Brutus XI (New York)
| Brutus claims "I have not met with any writer, who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy." To that end, he first examines the nature and extent of the judicial powers and second, "inquire(s) whether the courts who are to exercise them are so constituted as to afford reasonable ground of confidence that they will exercise them for the general good." He is particularly concerned with what we today would call judicial review. Article III, Section 2 says: "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, etc." His concern is: "what latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say." What particularly concerns Brutus is the word "equity." "By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it without being confined to the words or letter." And, note, he continues, "from this court there is no appeal." Accordingly, there will be a strong propensity within the Constitution to lead to the establishment of a consolidated rather than a confederated government by way of the power of judicial review. In fact, the judicial power enables the judiciary "to mold the government, into almost any shape they please."
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| March 1788
| Mar 20, 1788: Brutus XV (New York)
| Brutus reminds his reader that this is a continuation of Brutus XIV, where he showed "that the supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to no control. The business of this paper will be to illustrate this, and to show the danger that will result from it." His main point is "I question whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible." He is particularly concerned that the judges "feel themselves independent of heaven itself." 1) "There is no power above them that can correct their errors or control their decisions," 2) "they cannot be removed from office or suffer a diminution of their salaries, for any error in judgment or want of capacity," 3) "the power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature." Proof: "the supreme court … have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away."
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