 1787
| October 1787
|  Oct 5, 1787: Centinel I (Pennsylvania)
| The Antifederalist Centinel opens his remarks, addressed to the Freemen of Pennsylvania, with a reminder and a question: the essential liberties of the people are secured in the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights; are they secure under the proposed Constitution? He suggests that "all the blessings of liberty and the dearest privileges of freemen are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct."
Beware, he adds, the work of "artful and designing men." After all, the Convention is inspired by John Adams's political thought on "good government" which presumes a balancing of three orders of society in three branches. Accordingly, following Adams, we do not need to attend to the virtue of the people. Furthermore, the plan encourages the exercise of extensive powers by the general government—see the general welfare clause and the supremacy clause—over an extensive territory, which is a recipe not "for a regular balanced government" but for "a permanent ARISTOCRACY."
Centinel concludes that 1) the new Constitution does not include a bill of rights to ward of future crises and 2) we are not currently in such crisis that we must adopt the Constitution right away. That we are in crisis "is the argument of tyrants."
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| Oct 8, 1787: Federal Farmer I (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer's "first principle question" is ought we "to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution?" No. "Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, I conceive, will plunge us into commotions." True, we had difficulties under the Articles, but they weren't that bad to warrant the hasty adoption of a "consolidated" plan of the Constitution. "The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider a very unfortunate event to the United States. Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in the very part of the plan." He concludes: the proposed Constitution "appears to be a plan retaining some federal features, but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly, to one consolidated government of the United States." The Constitution, according to the Federal Farmer, is currently partly national and partly federal, but it contains the strong potentiality to become wholly national.
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| Oct 12, 1787: Federal Farmer IV (Virginia)
| The Antifederalist Federal Farmer, without mentioning James Wilson by name, criticizes the claim of the State House Speech that a bill of rights is unnecessary and dangerous. The Federal Farmer argues that the provisions of Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution are a partial bill of rights—see the restriction on ex post facto laws—so why don't we either drop them or go the whole distance and itemize a bill of rights that incudes "other essential rights"?
The Federal Farmer is concerned that the Constitution contains within itself the potentiality to become a consolidated government despite Wilson's argument that the Constitution only bestows powers that are clearly stated. Wilson seems to be arguing that the Framers created a confederacy with expressly delegated powers! How strange is that! The Federal Farmer thinks the Framers created a government and not simply a revision of a confederation. Thus the need for a comprehensive bill of rights since the Constitution contains the seeds of permitting a general government to operate with unlimited powers.
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| Oct 18, 1787: Brutus I (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist, anticipating by two weeks the opening paragraph of Federalist 1, also addressed to the people of New York, introduces his own first essay with the observation that "the most important question that was ever proposed to your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you." Nothing less than "the dignity of human nature" and the blessings of liberty are at stake. Brutus then argues that "although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it." The necessary and proper clause, the supremacy clause, and the judicial power have the potentiality to transform America from a system of confederated states into a "complete consolidated government." And anticipating the distinction between a democracy and a republic in Federalist 10 and 63, and agreeing that a representative government is to be preferred to a pure democracy, Brutus then argues that, contrary to wisdom and experience, the Framers have given us "an extensive republic" rather than a confederation of small republics. A "free republic" over "such vast extent" of territory is impracticable because, in time, the people will become "acquainted with very few of their rulers" and lose "confidence" in, and control over, the government.
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| Oct 27, 1787: An Old Whig IV (Pennsylvania)
| An Old Whig, a prominent Pennsylvania Antifederalist, contends that the Constitution contains the potentiality to produce a consolidated government ruling over one large territory. But "all political writers agree, that a Republican government can exist only in a narrow territory." In contrast to the proposed Constitution, he advocates that "a Confederacy of Republics must be the establishment in America." Given the tendency in the Constitution to destroy liberty, he turns to the case for a bill of rights. "Before we establish government, whose acts will be THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND, and whose power will extend to almost every case without exception, we ought carefully to guard ourselves by a BILL OF RIGHTS, against the invasion of those liberties which it is essential for us to retain, which it is of no use to government to strip us of; but which in the course of human events have been too often insulted with all the wantonness of an idle barbarity."
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| November 1787
| Nov 1, 1787: An Old Whig V (Pennsylvania)
| An Old Whig offers two arguments against the adoption of the Constitution in its present state. First, he argues that the people should never "surrender up" to government the "LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE." If we look at the Constitution, he continues, "not a word has been mentioned in any part of it; but we are left in this important article, as well as many others, entirely to the mercy of future rulers." And how will these wicked future rulers invade our essential rights of "liberty of conscience, of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their thoughts on public matters, of trial by jury, of holding themselves, their houses and papers free from seizure and search upon general suspicion and general warrants?" How will the people be "secured in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property without depending on the will and pleasure of their rulers?" The future rulers will rely on the "unlimited power of taxation," and the presence of "a standing army." Second, he warns that the Presidency "is in reality to be a KING." Are we ready "to receive a king?"
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| Nov 1, 1787: Brutus II (New York)
| He considers "the merits" of his argument in Brutus I "that to reduce the thirteen states into one government, would prove the destruction of your liberties." Again anticipating The Federalist, Brutus argues that "when a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid." But the foundation of the Constitution is poorly laid because it lacks a declaration of rights "expressly reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights, as are not necessary to be parted with." He rejects as "specious" the arguments of an unnamed Framer's State House speech (James Wilson) as to why a bill of rights is unnecessary: after all, "the powers, rights, and authority, granted to the general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government." Furthermore, why did the Framers secure certain rights in Article I, Section 9, "but omitted others of more importance"?
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| Nov 15, 1787: Brutus III (New York)
| In this essay, Brutus, anticipating Federalist 55, attempts to show that in the Constitution "the powers are not properly deposited, for the security of public liberty." He is a firm supporter of the position that "representation in government should be in exact proportion to the numbers" of people. Thus he is upset with 1) the 3/5 provision in the scheme of representation in the House, 2) equal representation for the States in the Senate, 3) the insufficiency in the number of representatives to be elected, 4) the lack of provision for a "resemblance" of the "true likeness of the people" in the assembly, 5) the probability that only the "rich" and "well born" will be represented, and 6) things will get worse. In short, "the representation is merely nominal—a mere burlesque; and that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence."
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| Nov 22, 1787: Cato V (New York)
| The New York Antifederalist Cato, summarizes the main points of his previous contribution in Cato IV: the "vague and inexplicit" nature of Article II, the Presidential article, could "lead to oppression and ruin." So why are you prepared to "adopt a system so vague, and which has discarded so many of your valuable rights? Is it because you do not believe that an American can be a tyrant?" He turns now to his critique of Article I: biennial elections are "a departure from the safe democratical principles of annual ones, that the number of representatives are too few" etc. "But this subject has been so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature of Brutus, that I shall content myself with referring you to him thereon."
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| Nov 29, 1787: Brutus IV (New York)
| Anticipating Federalist 51 and 55, Brutus states that "experience has taught mankind" the need for special precautions in the framing of free governments. "The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation; this, therefore, is the great desideratum in politics." It is more important that the government be in accordance "with the will of the people" and not "the will of the few" rather than "the administration of it be good or ill." Brutus ends with a prophecy: "power, lodged in the hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost always used to the oppression of the people, and the aggrandizement of themselves."
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| December 1787
| Dec 13, 1787: Brutus V (New York)
| Brutus turns to an examination of "the nature and extent of the powers granted
to the legislature." He considers this inquiry to be a necessary preliminary to the larger question of just how separate are the powers lodged in the separate branches of the federal government. He interprets these legislative powers, or means, in light of the Preamble that sets down the ends of the new government and the supremacy clause of Article VI; he declares that Congress is granted all power over taxation, and to pass all necessary and proper laws, all the better for carrying out the comprehensive and undefined ends of the Preamble. This Constitution does not guarantee to the states "the power to conduct certain internal concerns." All the more reason, says Brutus, for a bill of rights restricting the reach of Congress over the authority of the states and the liberty of the people, and a larger number of representatives in the Congress.
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| Dec 18, 1787: Agrippa VII (Massachusetts)
| The Massachusetts Antifederalist Agrippa says, "it is in vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local concerns, that the interest of the whole is preserved." And these local interests ought to be represented in the general government. But they are not adequately represented under the proposed Constitution. "The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation, as far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire, and upon all citizens…the government ought to have the same authority in one place as another." But the Constitution does not meet this test. "I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have proved the efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation, and the disadvantages of the new system, at lest some of the principal."
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| Dec 18, 1787: The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania)
| A minority of the delegates attending the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention offered 14 objections to the Constitution. They argued, in dissent, that the following rights were insecure under the Constitution: the right of conscience, trial by jury, no excessive fines and bail requirements, no unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of speech and press, bearing arms, and the right "to fowl and hunt." They also urged that adequate provision be made for the increase in the number of representatives along with their annual election, the protection of each state's jurisdiction over the militia as well as no standing armies in time of peace, a strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine and finally an assurance that the powers of the judiciary will be limited.
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1788
| January 1788
| Jan 17, 1788: Brutus IX (New York)
| Brutus begins the essay with the following statement: "The design of civil government is to protect the rights and promote the happiness of the people." And the question of this essay is: Does the Constitution pass this test? The state constitutions pass the test because their constitutions have either a prefatory bill of rights or restrictions on power within their documents. But the Framers of the general government leave us confused. They constrain the general government from doing some things—no bill of attainder—but don't address others—no standing army in time of peace—so what are they up to? Brutus criticizes the arguments of an unidentified "author" who argues that a provision in the Constitution with respect to standing armies is unnecessary and dangerous. Over half the essay is then devoted to criticizing the remarks of "a writer who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution" on behalf of standing armies. This writer, says Brutus, calls "into question the candor and integrity of those who advance the objection," and with insinuating that "their intention is to mislead the people, by alarming their passions, rather than convincing them by arguments addressed to their understandings." We think Brutus has in mind Hamilton's remarks in Federalist 1.
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| Jan 31, 1788: Brutus XI (New York)
| Brutus claims "I have not met with any writer, who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy." To that end, he first examines the nature and extent of the judicial powers and second, "inquire(s) whether the courts who are to exercise them are so constituted as to afford reasonable ground of confidence that they will exercise them for the general good." He is particularly concerned with what we today would call judicial review. Article III, Section 2 says: "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, etc." His concern is: "what latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say." What particularly concerns Brutus is the word "equity." "By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it without being confined to the words or letter." And, note, he continues, "from this court there is no appeal." Accordingly, there will be a strong propensity within the Constitution to lead to the establishment of a consolidated rather than a confederated government by way of the power of judicial review. In fact, the judicial power enables the judiciary "to mold the government, into almost any shape they please."
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| March 1788
| Mar 20, 1788: Brutus XV (New York)
| Brutus reminds his reader that this is a continuation of Brutus XIV, where he showed "that the supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to no control. The business of this paper will be to illustrate this, and to show the danger that will result from it." His main point is "I question whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible." He is particularly concerned that the judges "feel themselves independent of heaven itself." 1) "There is no power above them that can correct their errors or control their decisions," 2) "they cannot be removed from office or suffer a diminution of their salaries, for any error in judgment or want of capacity," 3) "the power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature." Proof: "the supreme court … have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away."
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